Thi s paper analyzes the problem of slow economic growth in Mexico.
Following the "lost decade" of the 1980s, Mexico's economic prospects brightened as the country began receiving large volumes of foreign capital and transformed itself into a major exporter of manufactures. The positive turn around came after a series of structural reforms that liberalized the trade regime and privatized most sectors of economic activity. Mexico renegotiated its foreign debt, consolidated its public fi nances and, with a temporary setback in 1995, decisively and successfully reined in infl ation. Yet despite the export boom, the substantial infl ows of foreign capital and a stabilized economy, Mexico has faced a persistent problem of slow growth.
Analysts have offered a number of explanations for this seeming paradox. In an influential study, Moreno-Brid (1999) argues that the external constraint on Mexican growth tightened after trade liberalization because of a rise in the elasticity of imports with respect to gross domestic product (GDP).
1 According to Blecker (2007) , the constraint has at times been reinforced by the volatility of capital fl ows and the economic cycle of the United States, as well as by the recurrent appreciation of the peso. Other authors point to the perverse effects of the country's prolonged credit crunch, refl ecting the inadequate pace of reforms in the judicial and banking systems. 2 This paper offers a complementary interpretation of the slow-growth problem in Mexico. Its point of departure is the observation that since the late 1980s Mexican macroeconomic management -and monetary policy in particular-has focused on reducing infl ation. As a result of this prolonged disinflationary mode, the peso has appreciated in real terms and returns on investment have consequently declined. The adverse impact that the peso's appreciation has had on profi tability has been reinforced by a long-term fall in the output/capital ratio. As a result, aggregate investment has not refl ected the dynamism of exports and has been inadequate to sustain high rates of economic growth.
The paper is organized as follows: section II describes Mexico's recent macroeconomic performance; section III estimates the contribution of exports and investment to GDP growth; section IV examines the relationship between profi ts, investment and the real exchange rate; and section V presents the conclusions.
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Introduction
The author is grateful for the valuable comments offered by Julio López, Jaime Ros, an anonymous reviewer, and participants at the Ninth International Post Keynesian Conference and the Seventh Conference of the Americas, as well as for the fi nancial support received from the National Science and Technology Council of Mexico (CONACYT, Project 47140-S). 1 See also López and Cruz (2000) and Pacheco-López (2005) .
II
Mexico's recent macroeconomic performance
After the outbreak of the debt crisis in 1982, Mexico's economic growth stalled. During 1982 During -1988 GDP rose barely 0.2% a year. Yet the export sector expanded rapidly, driven by the weakness of the domestic market and the trade liberalization measures implemented in 1986 -1987 . In relation to 1960 -1977 , the share of total exports in GDP more than doubled. Particularly impressive was the expansion of manufacturing exports, which rose at an average annual rate of 18.2% (Table 1) .
At the end of the 1980s a combination of factors -including a new stabilization plan, the defi nitive renegotiation of the country's external debt, and renewed access for developing countries to the world capital market-turned around the outlook for the Mexican economy. Foreign investment rose sharply, from 2.4% of GDP in 1982 GDP in -1988 GDP in to 6.3% in 1989 GDP in -1994 . The export sector continued to perform strongly, with an average annual growth of 7.8%. Manufacturing exports, in particular, rose at an average rate of 12.1% and came to represent 75% of goods exports. Yet despite the export boom and surging capital infl ows, growth began to slow after peaking at 5% in 1990. The average growth rate of GDP in 1989-1994 was a modest 3.9%.
As is well known, Mexico suffered a currency crisis in December of 1994 and a full-blown fi nancial crisis in 1995. There were large outfl ows of capital, due mainly to the reversal of previous portfolio investments. GDP ended up falling by more than 6% in 1995. Economic activity recovered quickly, though, 1960-1977 1978-1981 1982-1988 1989-1994 1996-2007 1961-1977. bb 1963-1977. cc 1962-1977. dd Excludes fourth quarter of 1994. ee 1970-1977. ff 1971-1977. gg 1968-1977. hh 1969-1977. and in 1996 GDP rose by more than 5%. Capital infl ows returned, and averaged 3.4% of GDP annually between 1996 and 2007. 3 Manufacturing exports continued to expand, although at a slower pace than in the early 1990s. Over 1996-2007, manufactures represented 85% of goods exports, and by 1998 Mexico was the world's fourthlargest exporter of manufactures (Lall 2000) . Exports not only grew, but they improved in quality as well. The composition of the export basket came to look like that of countries with per capita incomes higher than Mexico's (Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik 2007, Figure 4) . The country's exports now consist for the most part of medium-or high-tech goods (Lall 2000) , and they have diversifi ed since the entry into force of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Feenstra and Kee 2007) .
Despite the recovery of foreign investment and the quantitative and qualitative development of exports, average annual GDP growth in 1996-2007 was only 3.6%. The problem was not that Mexico was unable to achieve relatively high GDP growth rates -indeed, it did so in 1990, 1997 and 2000-but rather that those rates did not last long. There are factors at play that reduce the growth rate and tend to keep it low. This paper argues that one of those factors is the behaviour of the real exchange rate, through its impact on profi tability and investment.
While the economy failed to sustain high rates of GDP growth, macroeconomic management -and monetary policy in particular-focused on reducing infl ation (Ramos and Torres 2005; Galindo and Ros, 2008; Ibarra, 2008a) . This came after the economy faced a serious infl ation problem throughout most of the 1980s, with infl ation climbing by 12.3 percentage points per year, and soaring to 131.8% in 1987. Average annual infl ation over the period 1982-1988 was 88%.
Disinfl ation began in 1988. At fi rst it was swift, with the annual infl ation rate falling from around 180% at the beginning of 1988 to less than 20% a year later. Thereafter the process slowed: the average annual inflation rate between 1989 and 1994 was 16.9%, dropping to 6.9% in 1994.
The disinfl ationary scheme collapsed in December 1994, when Mexico was forced to abandon an explicit exchange rate band and let the peso fl oat. The subsequent depreciation of the currency caused a surge in infl ation. Yet this phenomenon was short-lived, and the economy entered into a new stage of disinfl ation. Inflation peaked at 34.4% in 1996 and reached a minimum of 3.6% in 2006; on average, it fell by 2.6 percentage points a year.
In short, Mexico's macroeconomic management has been in "disinfl ationary mode" since the late 1980s. This has had a sharp impact on the exchange rate. Given the restrictive bias of monetary policy, the rate of currency depreciation has not kept pace with the infl ation differential between Mexico and the United States. As can be seen from the effective real index calculated by the Bank of Mexico (Table 1 , fi nal lines), the result is that the peso has tended to appreciate in real terms.
The peso's appreciation contributed to the success of disinfl ation (Ibarra 2003) but it impacted adversely on the profi tability of the tradables sector. The evolution of the unit labour cost in manufactures (in dollars and relative to the United States) illustrates the impact. In 1988, after an important round of trade liberalization, the labour cost index stood at 82.9 (1990 = 100). In the first disinflationary period (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) it rose steadily at a rate of 8% a year, peaking at 138.8% in 1993. The sharp nominal currency depreciation of 1995 reduced it to the level observed in the mid-1980s (1996 = 75.4), but with renewed disinfl ation the relative cost of labour started rising again, and reached a level of 135.7 in 2007 (Table 1) .
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What is the cause of the Mexican economy's meagre growth? There is broad recognition in the literature on economic growth that the issue can be usefully addressed at different levels. A distinction is usually made between the proximate and the underlying determinants of GDP growth. Decomposition exercises are an example of the fi rst approach. The following paragraphs examine the evolution of GDP in light of the contribution of the different components of aggregate demand. 4 The decomposition of GDP is useful for analyzing Mexico's growth experience because it highlights elements such as the sustained expansion of exports since the late 1980s, the upward trend in the import rate after trade liberalization, and the boom in consumer spending at the beginning of the 1990s. We can guess that these factors are important from a medium-term perspective. There is the question, for example, of determining the net effect of exports on aggregate growth, in a strictly accounting sense, bearing in mind the virtually simultaneous rise in the import rate. As exports rose, imports displaced local production.
The point of departure is the simple identity between GDP Y and aggregate demand, where the latter is the sum of private and government consumption (C + G), investment I and net exports (X -M). The identity can be re-stated as:
( 1) where d 0 , the Keynesian demand multiplier, is by defi nition equal to the reciprocal of the domestic saving rate [s=(Y-C-G)/Y] plus the import rate (m=M/Y).
Growth in GDP must be backed by an expansion in investment and exports, although sustained changes in the multiplier can also have an infl uence. Figure 1 shows that, after a period of relative stability starting in at least the 1960s, the demand multiplier began a steep descent in 1987, falling from 3.6 in 1986 to 1.6 in 2007.
By defi nition, variations in the multiplier refl ect the combined infl uence of the saving rate and the import rate. The saving rate has fl uctuated around a level of 0.20. The sustained fall in the demand multiplier is explained by the behaviour of the import rate, which rose from 0.084 in 1986 to 0.46 in 2007. Following major rounds of trade liberalization in 1986-1987 and in 1994 , there were sharp increases in the import rate. Figure 2 shows that all components of the rate shared this tendency.
5
Apart from trade liberalization, changes in the real exchange rate are bound to have an infl uence on the import rate. Figure 3 presents the joint evolution of the import rate and the real exchange rate index based on the consumer price index (CPI). For the sake of visual effectiveness, the fi gure shows the reciprocal index, so that an increase indicates a real appreciation of the currency. There is a positive and substantial association III
Exports, investment and GDP growth in Mexico
4 See Berg and Taylor (2000) for a similar methodology, and Ros and Lustig (2000) for its application to Mexico. 5 See the appendix for a defi nition of these components. The link between the real exchange rate and the import rate would have to be subjected to a rigorous test. But the above evidence suggests that the tendency of the currency to appreciate in real terms may have accentuated the impact of trade liberalization, and may well have produced an "excessive" jump in the import rate (Moreno-Brid, Santamaría and Rivas 2005a and 2005b) . Figure 4 shows the contributions, adjusted by the multiplier, of investment and exports to GDP since 1960. GDP growth in the initial portion of the sample was supported by rising investment. Using equation (1), it can be calculated that around 80% of the cumulative GDP growth between 1960 and 1977 can be attributed to investment.
The contribution of the various components of aggregate demand reversed after trade liberalization, with exports becoming the main source of GDP growth. Between 1988 and 2007, GDP rose by 829.1 billion 1993 pesos: 93% of this growth corresponded to exports and only 7% to investment (again, after adjusting both variables for changes in the multiplier). At fi rst glance, it would seem that Mexico's failure to achieve strong economic growth since the 1980s can be attributed to the sluggish behaviour of investment. 50 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 6 To cast this in greater detail: the average growth rate of real investment in this period was 5%, which was mostly cancelled out by a cumulative decline of 50% in the demand multiplier. The average growth rate of investment adjusted by the multiplier was 1%; the corresponding fi gure for exports was 5.6%. Conclusions as to the impact of the components of aggregate demand on GDP growth depend on the length of the period considered. Following the fi rst round of trade liberalization, GDP growth was determined by investment, with exports making only a minimal contribution (Ros, Draisma et al. 1996; Ros and Lustig 2000) . The situation was reversed after the North American Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into effect. 7 In a similar conclusion, Blyde and Fernández-Arias (2004) calculate that the capital-labour ratio in Mexico in the 1990s was more than 20% lower than what would be expected for a country at Mexico's level of development; in Latin America, only Guatemala was in a worse position.
From the standpoint of aggregate demand, the relative pace of growth in investment and exports is irrelevant: what matters is the overall pace. But from the supply side the distinction is important. In contrast to exports, investment creates installed capacity directly.
Thus, a weak investment performance also limits GDP growth indirectly, by creating bottlenecks that can slow export growth and raise the import rate even further.
The foregoing decomposition is based on equation (1), which does not distinguish between private and public expenditure. In a more detailed analysis, government expenditure can be separated out, and the infl uence of variations in the tax rate can be taken into account. Starting once again with the GDP identity, this can be written as:
( 2) where I P and I G represent private and government investment. The demand multiplier now depends on the private saving rate [s
P =(Y-T-C)/Y, where T is taxes]
, the tax rate (t=T/Y) and the import rate. Figure 5 illustrates the behaviour of the redefi ned demand multiplier and its components since 1980. Here again, the multiplier shows a downward trend from the second half of the 1980s, attributable to a rising import rate. The private saving rate and the tax rate show a marked cyclical behaviour. 8 The private saving rate displays slightly greater fl uctuations than the total saving rate presented earlier in fi gure 1; this refl ects the fact that the evolution of the tax rate tends to mirror the private saving rate (when the latter is calculated without the tax rate). Figure 6 shows the contribution to GDP of the different components of aggregate demand since 1980. The fi gure reveals something new: in Mexico, the weakness of private investment, which has tended to depress GDP growth, has been compounded by the stagnation of public investment.
Several authors have suggested the possibility that the external sector, through a rise in the import rate, has constrained Mexico's growth. But Mexico has received signifi cant infl ows of foreign capital since the early 1990s, which would tend to alleviate this possible constraint. Thus, the behaviour of investment demand is revealing when looked at from the balance of payments perspective.
According to the balance of payments identity, in any given period, the fl ow of foreign capital to a country must be equal to the sum of domestic capital outfl ows, the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves by the central bank, and the current account defi cit:
Foreign capital infl ows = domestic capital outfl ows + reserves accumulation + current account defi cit, (3) while the current account defi cit must be equal to the difference between domestic saving and investment. 8 The tax rate includes all public sector revenues classifi ed as taxes (basically, income tax and value added tax) derived from non-oil economic activities, plus gasoline taxes. The initial external situation is well known. Foreign capital infl ows were relatively low (averaging 1.7% of GDP), and the economy was forced to transfer resources abroad through a current account surplus (0.7% of GDP). From a balance of payments perspective, these resources were used up partly in a modest accumulation of reserves (averaging 0.6% of GDP) and mostly to sustain an outfl ow of capital (1.8% of GDP). During this period the (fi xed) investment rate was 18.5% of GDP.
The macroeconomic context turned around completely in the following years. A combination of local and external factors sparked a great infl ow of foreign capital, averaging 7.3% of GDP. There was an important shift in the current account balance, which recorded a defi cit of 5.3% of GDP. Despite the heavy capital infl ow, the average investment rate over the period 1990-1994 was only 19.2% of GDP, i.e. less than one point above the rate for the previous period.
The sharp change in the current account balance had as its main counterpart a reduction in the domestic saving rate.
In 1996-2007, foreign capital infl ows declined on average to 3.4% of GDP, but they remained well above the fl ows observed in the 1980s. Nearly a quarter of the capital infl ow was accumulated as reserves. The current account defi cit averaged only 1.8% of GDP, well below the 5.3% recorded in the early 1990s. As the counterpart to the lower current account defi cit, there was a recovery in the domestic saving rate, while the investment rate rose slightly, from 19.2% to 19.9% of GDP. 9 In short, during the period 1996-2007 the average investment rate exceeded that of the "lost years" of 1983-1989 by less than 1.5% of GDP, a modest adjustment that took place in the midst of substantial infl ows of foreign capital. The large accumulation of reserves during this period suggests that, although the higher import rate could have potentially tightened the external constraint on growth, the constraint did not apply.
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The weak growth of the Mexican economy can be attributed, under one approach, to the low dynamism of investment in a context defi ned by disinfl ation and the tendency of the peso to appreciate in real terms. This section examines formally the effect of the real exchange rate on the profi tability of the manufacturing sector and, by that channel, on investment.
10
To conduct the empirical analysis, let us assume that the prices set by fi rms operating under imperfect competition depend on a (possibly varying) profi t margin and the unit labour cost, according to the formula:
where P is the domestic price index in local currency, u is the profi t margin, a is labour employed per unit of output, W is the nominal wage, and Ω is the unit labour cost. The equation is divided by the nominal exchange rate S (defi ned in terms of pesos per dollar) to convert the domestic price and the unit labour cost into dollars. We can write an equation similar to (4) for the external economy, indicating the external variables with an asterisk. Dividing the domestic price equation by its external counterpart, and restating, we obtain:
Equation (5) indicates that a relative increase in the country's unit labour cost must be matched by 
IV
Investment and the profi t rate
10 Using data for the period from the fi rst quarter of 1981 to the second quarter of 2000, Lederman, Menéndez et al. (2003) show that a higher volatility in the real exchange rate tends to depress the investment rate in Mexico. There has been much debate over the impact of the real exchange rate on the level and growth rate of GDP. Some authors have found mostly contractionary effects; see Kamin and Rogers (2000) and the references in that paper; for the opposite view, see Galindo and Ros (2008) , Ibarra (2008b) , and Blecker (2007) .
either an increase in its relative prices or a reduction in its relative profi t margin, where a lower profi t margin would produce a fall in the share of profi ts in GDP (z) according to the formula: Figure 8 illustrates the evolution of Mexico's relative labour cost and relative consumer prices (summarized earlier in table 1). It will be recalled that the first series corresponds to the ratio of the unit labour cost in manufactures, in dollars, between Mexico and the United States, while the second series corresponds to the CPI-based multilateral real exchange rate index of the Bank of Mexico; for the sake of visual effectiveness, the latter index has been inverted so that an increase indicates a real appreciation.
There is a solid association between the two series, as equation (5) suggests, with a correlation coeffi cient of 0.8311 during the period 1985-2007. Changes in relative costs and relative prices are closely connected. A misaligned exchange rate -i.e. one that does not isolate relative costs from changes in relative nominal wages and productivities-could cause a slowing of exports and a loss of market share.
We can examine this effect by regressing the growth of exports on the real exchange rate, and controlling for market growth.
11 Table 2 presents the results of the unit root test on the variables used in the econometric analysis. The unit root hypothesis is rejected for nearly all variables, in particular by the Phillips-Perron test.
Some variables have borderline p-values in the augmented Dickey-Fuller test. The share of profits in value added from manufacturing is probably not stationary, or it may be stationary around a linear trend. Because of this ambiguity, the regressions include the results of unit root tests applied to the residuals of the long-term version of the estimated equations. As is well known, the possibility of a spurious regression can be discarded when the unit root hypothesis for the residuals is rejected.
The regressions were estimated with quarterly series corresponding to the period 1988-2007, i.e. the period subsequent to Mexico's trade liberalization. In all cases the point of departure was an autoregressive distributed lag model, typically with four lags in the 11 See the appendix for the source and precise defi nition of the variables included in the regressions of this section. Inverted real exchange rate index Relative labour cost index dependent variable and the regressors, although some models had to begin with fi ve lags in the dependent variable to correct a problem of autocorrelation in the residuals. The initial lag structure was then simplifi ed according to the statistical signifi cance of each coeffi cient.
To make sure that the simplifi cation yielding the fi nal model is acceptable in statistical terms, all the regressions include a Wald test for the hypothesis that the eliminated variables have coeffi cients that are jointly equal to zero. They also include the Jarque-Bera test for the normal distribution of residuals, the BreuschGodfrey test for the absence of up to fourth-order autocorrelation, the Engle test for the absence of ARCH (autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic) errors, and Ramsey's RESET test for general specifi cation.
An ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of the growth rate of manufacturing exports (GEXP) on the logarithm of the CPI-based real exchange rate index (LNRER), the growth rate of the United States Industrial Production Index (GUS) and two dummy variables to capture a temporary increment -with the formation of NAFTA-in export growth during 1994 and 1995 (or a permanent increase in the level of exports since 1994, which is equivalent) produces the following results: 12 12 Although not statistically signifi cant, the fi fth lag of GEXP was retained to eliminate a problem of autocorrelation in the residuals. Adjusted R 2 = 0.8568. Jarque-Bera statistic (probability): 0.4826 (0.7856). F-statistic from the Breusch-Godfrey fourth-order test (probability): 1.7598 (0.1479) F-statistic from the Engle ARCH effect test (probability): 2.4103 (0.1248). F-statistic from the Ramsey RESET test (probability): 1.9998 (0.1619). F-statistic from the Wald test (probability): 0.9103 (0.5143). Unit root tests on long-run residuals (with intercept; see the specifi cations in Table 2 ). t-statistic from the augmented Dickey-Fuller test (probability): -3.6182 (0.0076). Adjusted t-statistic from the Phillips-Perron test (probability): -4.4999 (0.0005).
where the long-run solution is: estimated coeffi cient on the real exchange rate allows us to attribute nine points of this decrease to currency appreciation.
Equations (5) and (6) imply that a currency appreciation can have an adverse effect on profit margins and thus on the share of profits in GDP. Figure 9 shows the close link between that share in Mexican manufactures (calculated as unity minus the share of wages and salaries in value added) and the real exchange rate. At the beginning of the 1990s, and again in the wake of the 1995 fi nancial crisis, the profi t share fell as the currency appreciated.
It is possible, however, that the changes in the profit share reflect the economic cycle rather than variations in the real exchange rate. To examine this possibility, an OLS regression of the profi t share in manufactures (PROFIT) on the growth rate of the manufacturing production index of Mexico (GMPI) and the logarithm of the real exchange rate index was estimated, with the following results: 13 13 Although not shown, the regressions include a linear trend, given the possible trend-stationarity of the profi t share (see table 2), and quarterly dummy variables. 14 The positive sign of the real exchange rate coeffi cient supports a causality interpretation that runs from the real exchange rate to the profi t share. Assume causality ran the other way. If fi rms exogenously raised their prices (and thus their profi t margin and the profi t share), Adjusted R 2 = 0.9611. Jarque-Bera statistic (probability): 1.43 15 (0.4888). F-statistic from the Breusch-Godfrey fourth-order test (probability): 0.3717 (0.8280). F-statistic from the Engle ARCH effect test (probability): 0.0679 (0.7952). F-statistic from the Ramsey RESET test (probability): 2.0 103 (0.1609). F-statistic from the Wald test (probability): 1.0365 (0.4195). Unit root tests on long-run residuals (with intercept; see the specifi cations in Table 2 ): t-statistic from the augmented Dickey-Fuller test (probability): -3.3941 (0.0142). Adjusted t-statistic from the Phillips-Perron test (probability): -4.2871 (0.0009).
where the long-run solution is:
Equation (8) shows that a decline of the profi t share in manufacturing value added is associated with an appreciation in the currency.
14 The estimated effect is substantial. For example, according to the long-run version of the equation, the currency appreciation of 1988-1993 tended to produce a drop of 15 percentage points in the profi t share, while the actual decline was 9.5 points.
To get a quantitative idea of the effect of the profi t share on investment, an OLS regression of the growth rate of fi xed investment (GINV) on the profi t share in manufactures, the GDP growth rate (GGDP), the nominal interest rate (NIR) and the infl ation rate (INF) was estimated, with the following results: 15 then the currency would appreciate. The real exchange rate and the profi t share would be negatively correlated. 15 Separating the nominal interest rate and the infl ation rate produced better results than using their difference as a measure of the real interest rate. The regression also included a linear trend (see footnote 13) and, in order to achieve normality of the residuals, a dummy variable for the third quarter of 1989.
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The coeffi cients estimated have the expected signs, with an implicit negative effect of the real interest rate on investment growth and a positive effect from the GDP growth rate. The profi t share has a lagged positive effect on investment growth. The size of the effect is signifi cant. For example, the 6.5 point fall in the profi t share during the period 1996-2002 tended to reduce the investment growth rate by six points, or about one-third of the reduction actually observed.
16
Thus far, a currency appreciation tends to reduce GDP growth, not only by its oft-noted effect on export growth but also by its effect on the profi t share and investment growth. There is a possible offsetting effect. If the workers' saving rate is less than that of investors, a currency appreciation will tend to reduce the overall saving rate by increasing the share of labour in income.
A glance at fi gures 5 and 8 suggests that there is indeed a close connection between the real exchange rate and the private saving rate in Mexico. But the saving rate could also react to changes in the GDP growth rate. To separate these effects, an OLS regression of the private saving rate (SAVING) 17 on the real exchange rate and the GDP growth rate was estimated, yielding: where the long-run solution is:
The private saving rate appears to behave in (lagged) countercyclical fashion, a somewhat anomalous result in light of permanent-income theories of consumption, but which could be explained by the existence of consumer credit constraints. As expected, the real exchange rate has a marked effect on the saving rate. For example, according to the long-run real exchange rate coeffi cient, the 52% appreciation between 1996 and 2002 tended to reduce the saving rate by around 7.5 percentage points, a fi gure that is one percentage point higher than the reduction actually observed.
18
The results show that a currency appreciation has partial effects on aggregate demand that act in opposite directions: on the one hand, it depresses aggregate demand by its negative effect on the trade balance and the profi tability of investment, while on the other hand, it increases demand by a fall in the saving rate. In principle, the net outcome is uncertain.
19
In the specifi c case of Mexico, and particularly since NAFTA came into effect, the currency appreciationinduced decline in the saving rate has been more than offset by the increased share of imports in GDP (due presumably to that same appreciation and to the liberalization of the trade regime). As a result, the demand multiplier dropped. This, together with the sluggish pace of investment, produced a fl at path for the investment levels adjusted by the multiplier and the contribution of this variable to GDP growth was almost nil.
Our analysis has focused on the profit share. Yet the behaviour of the profi t rate (profi ts/capital) r depends not only on the profi t share (profi ts/GDP) but also on the GDP/capital ratio k, by the defi nition:
It is difficult to measure the GDP/capital ratio because a long series for the capital stock is unavailable. However, an estimate can be obtained from the following equation: where the long-run solution is:
18 A comment on causality, similar to that made with respect to the PROFIT equation (see footnote 14), is in order here. Assume the saving rate increased exogenously. The current account balance would also increase and, if there were a signifi cant effect working through this channel, the currency would appreciate. In such case, the real exchange rate and the saving rate would be negatively correlated. 19 For a theoretical analysis of this issue, see Blecker (2002) .
where g is the GDP growth rate, i is the investment rate (fi xed investment/GDP) and k m is the output/capital ratio.
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The observations for k m were derived as residuals from the annual series for the GDP growth rate and the investment rate. At this frequency, the series can be highly volatile due to fluctuations in aggregate demand and, consequently, in the degree of capacity utilization. The fl uctuations were eliminated using the Hodrick-Prescott trends of the series or their averages over long periods. Figure 10 presents the Hodrick-Prescott trends for 1960-2007 and shows that there was a decline in the GDP/capital ratio throughout the 1960s, 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s. As we might expect, the period averages in table 3 reveal the same pattern. The average GDP/capital ratio dropped from 0.35 in 1960-1977 to 0.22 in the early 1990s, and to 0.18 after 1996.
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Because we are focusing on Hodrick-Prescott trends and long-run average variations, the decline in the GDP/capital ratio must have a technological basis. It could also reflect a persistent problem of capital underutilization, as suggested by the opinion surveys conducted by the Bank of Mexico among manufacturing industry executives (López, no date) . In this case, aggregate demand growth would have fallen persistently short of the expectations that fi rms entertained when making their investment decisions.
But whether this is a technological phenomenon or the result of inadequate aggregate demand, the fact is that a fall in the GDP/capital ratio reduces not only the GDP growth rate (equation 12) but also the profi t rate (equation 11). This reinforces the adverse profi t-share effect of the peso's appreciation on profi tability. 20 There is a limitation in the fact that the profi t rate depends on the average GDP/capital ratio, while equation 12 produces an estimate of the marginal ratio. 21 Working in a different analytical context, Santaella (1998) and De Gregorio and Lee (1999) offer evidence that total factor productivity growth in Mexico declined signifi cantly since the 1970s, recording negative rates during the 1980s and 1990s. This implies a negative effect on the profi t rate. 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 At the end of the 1980s, Mexico became the recipient of large fl ows of capital and a top exporter of manufactured goods, but it failed to sustain high rates of economic growth. Analysts of the Mexican economy have offered various explanations for this seeming paradox. This paper argues that a simple history of relative prices and investment profi tability is worth considering.
Since the late 1980s, Mexico's macroeconomic management, and its monetary policy in particular, have focused on reducing infl ation. The core of that effort lasted more than 15 years, interrupted temporarily by the 1995 fi nancial crisis.
As the disinflationary process advanced, the peso appreciated in real terms. Currency appreciation generally reduces the GDP growth rate directly through its impact on net exports, as can be seen in the slowing of export growth at the beginning of this decade. But currency appreciation can also reduce GDP growth indirectly through its impact on the share of profi ts in GDP. This paper looks at the indirect channel in Mexico's case, and presents econometric evidence to show that the real exchange rate has had signifi cant effects on the profi t share of the manufacturing sector and on the share of returns on investment
The profit rate depends both on the share of profi ts in GDP and on the GDP/capital ratio. The paper shows that the (marginal) GDP/capital ratio in the slow-growth period has been well below the levels observed in Mexico during the era of rapid growth prior to the 1980s. By defi nition, a drop in the GDP/ capital ratio reduces the GDP growth rate, regardless of the investment rate, but it also tends to reduce the investment rate itself because of its impact on the profi t rate. It is not surprising, then, that the bulk of GDP growth should have come from the expansion of exports, as can be seen from a simple decomposition of GDP from the demand side, while the contribution of investment has been insignifi cant. The slow growth of the Mexican economy is in part a history of sluggish investment and low profi tability in a situation of disinfl ation and real currency appreciation.
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Conclusions
APPENDIX
Defi nitions and data sources PROFIT: quarterly average of the profi t share, calculated as unity minus the ratio of wages and salaries to value added in manufactures. The calculation used the average ratio of value added to gross production from the INEGI Annual Industrial Survey for the longest available period (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) in order to calculate value added from the monthly index. Source: original monthly data in current pesos, taken from the INEGI Monthly Industrial Survey.
GMPI: four-quarter change in the manufacturing production index. Source: original monthly index from INEGI.
